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 Auditor Independence and Audit Risk: A Reconceptualisation 
 
ABSTRACT 
The principles-based UK regulatory framework for auditor independence (ICAEW 2001), 
adopted in 1997, identifies threats to both to independence in fact and in appearance and 
the safeguards which control these threats. These principles are incorporated in the IFAC 
(2001) ethics framework. Drawing on six case studies of interactions involving 
significant accounting issues between audit engagement partners and finance directors in 
UK listed companies, we analyse the threats and safeguards to auditor independence in 
fact which are relevant to the outcome of each interaction. Poor outcomes arise where the 
safeguards are insufficient defence against the threats. Further examples of existing 
threats are identified and additional threats emerge, in particular an urgency threat, and a 
loss of face threat. Management motivation is found to be a key driver of pressure on an 
auditor. Threats to independence are found to arise in audit firms and these are not 
recognised in the current audit risk model. An extended risk model incorporating within-
firm risk is suggested. 
 
Keywords: independence; risk; threats; safeguards.
 2
Auditor Independence and Audit Risk: A Reconceptualisation 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Independent audit of company financial statements is a key component of the regulatory 
framework which supports capital markets. Concerns are often expressed by regulators 
and other observers as to whether auditors are sufficiently independent and competent, 
particularly in the aftermath of corporate failures or material changes to previously 
approved audited accounts. The restatement of the Enron accounts and the collapse of 
Andersen following the obstruction of justice finding against the firm (SEC 2002) shows 
the devastating effect of loss of confidence in the integrity of an audit firm. Despite the 
lack of knowledge about independence in fact, Enron has severely compromised 
independence in appearance. Failure by auditors to identify and report on misleading 
financial information undermines the economic value of audit, which is damaging to all 
firms in the long run.  Concerns have also been expressed about aggressive earnings 
management practices (Levitt 1998; APB 2001). However the most serious concern for 
regulators is that audit failures can also undermine the stability of the capital markets if 
users lose faith in the audit process.   
 
Failure by auditors to detect a material error or misstatement in accounting information 
can arise from three main causes, two of which may be attributed to audit failure (Hall 
and Renner 1991). First, auditors may either fail to detect a material error or 
misstatement, or, having detected an error, fail to recognise it, because they have carried 
out a substandard audit, i.e. the auditors are incompetent. Second, auditors may identify a 
material error or misstatement and fail to report it or fail to persuade the directors to put it 
right, i.e. the auditors lack independence. Third, directors may deliberately deceive 
auditors. In cases of deliberate deception, auditors may not be held responsible for failure 
to detect a problem.     
 
A key problem for both regulators and standard setters is that the audit process itself is 
unobservable. Only the participants in the process, i.e. auditors and the company 
management, know how decisions are reached. Because the process is unobservable , the 
regulatory framework which sets out requirements both for competence and 
independence of auditors must not only be effective as a working model for auditors to 
adhere to, it must also be capable of convincing those who rely on the audit service that 
they are adequately protected by the framework against auditors who are incompetent or 
who lack independence.  For audit to retain its value to capital markets, the framework 
must be seen to protect the appearance of integrity in the audit process as well as the fact 
of it.  
 
The difficulties of gaining access to real-life settings have also made it difficult for 
independent researchers to access information about competence and independence in 
fact (Dye 1991). Thus, the only publicly available evidence of auditors’ actual 
performance arises from cases where audits have failed. As a consequence, research has 
concentrated on surveying perceptions about audit, i.e. independence in appearance (see, 
for example Bartlett (1997) in the US and Beattie et al. (1999) in the UK). More recently, 
researchers in the US have begun to carry out experimental studies that examine the 
influence on auditors’ behaviour of a range of factors.  These factors are of four types: 
individual characteristics, within-firm factors, client company factors and regulatory 
factors.  See, for example, Shafer et al. (1999, 2001), DeZoort and Lord (1997), King 
(2002), Lord and DeZoort (2001), Thorne and Hardwick (2001) and Trompeter (1994). 
There are also a few recent studies that seek direct evidence of auditors’ behaviour from 
real-life settings, using a questionnaire approach.  The focus of these studies is auditor-client 
interactions generally, in particular the process of negotiation and the factors that influence 
the outcome (see Gibbins et al. (1999) and Nelson et al. (2002) in the US, and Beattie et al. 
(2000) in the UK).   
 
The recent book Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is really About (Beattie, 
Fearnley and Brandt, 2001) exceptionally uses a detailed case study approach to analyse six 
real cases covering 22 audit interactions between finance directors (FDs) and audit 
engagement partners (AEPs).  The overall objective of the study was to develop a grounded 
theory to explain what key factors influence the decision-making process when an auditor 
is confronted with difficult and contentious accounting issues.  The cases were identified 
from the previous questionnaire study (Beattie et al., 2000) in which respondents were 
asked whether they were willing to be interviewed.  Six FDs who indicated high levels of 
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negotiation and discussion agreed to be interviewed and gave permission for their audit 
engagement partner to be interviewed, with the consent of the audit firm. The less 
litigious environment in the UK, compared to the US, makes research of this nature still 
possible. 
 
The cornerstone of the process by which auditors decide on the scope of their work has 
been an internationally recognised risk model, which is incorporated into auditing 
standards e.g. in the UK in SAS 300 (APB 1995). This model enables the auditor to 
determine the scope of  audit testing for error or misstatement in each client company by 
assessing the risk of error or misstatement arising in that company. In recent years, 
doubts have been expressed as to whether some of the current approaches to audit risk 
assessment adopted by large firms are fully compatible with the generally accepted risk 
model (Lemon et al. 2000). The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board is 
revising its approach to audit risk and has recently issued exposure drafts on audit risk 
(IFAC 2002). 
 
Concerns about the risk model have been paralleled by recent concerns about auditor 
independence, which started to emerge from the SEC (Levitt 1998) before the Enron and 
Worldcom scandals broke.  The SEC revised its independence rules in November 2000 
(SEC 2000). New independence frameworks have recently been issued by the European 
Commission (EC 2001) and the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC 2001). In 
the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in 2002 following the Worldcom scandal, has 
(amongst other provisions) introduced a new framework for oversight of listed company 
auditors in the form of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). The 
PCAOB will take responsibility for ethical standards to be used by accounting firms 
registered with it. In the UK, following a post-Enron government inquiry, responsibility 
for the setting of standards for auditor independence has been transferred to the Auditing 
Practices Board which is independent of the profession (Department of Trade and 
Industry 2003). There are also concerns about aggressive earnings management and the 
auditors’ ability to prevent it (APB 2001) and there is a growing academic literature in 
relation to the identification and control of earnings management and the quality of 
financial reporting generally. These issues have arisen at a time when the drive towards 
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global markets is encouraging regulators to seek convergence of accounting and auditing 
practices worldwide. The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is seeking 
wider adoption of its standards and the EU has issued a regulation requiring all 
companies listed in the EU to prepare their consolidated accounts under International 
Accounting Standards for financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2005 (EU 
2002). The European Commission is also liaising with other governments in Europe in 
developing plans to adopt International Standards of Auditing from the same date (Co-
ordinating Group on Auditing and Accounting Issues 2002).  
 
Behind Closed Doors: What Company Audit is Really About (hereafter BCD) provides an 
analysis of six company case studies which show how accounting issues which arise 
during the audit process are resolved between audit engagement partners (AEPs) and 
finance directors (FDs). From these cases, audit quality is shown to be an holistic activity 
in which issues of competence, independence in fact and audit risk are inextricably 
linked. In this paper, we specifically explore risk and independence. Under current 
frameworks, independence and risk are regarded as separate issues. In UK standards, 
auditor independence is not factored into the audit risk model but appears in the 
profession’s ethical guide. More recently, the independence frameworks issued by the EC 
(2001), elements of which have been adopted in the UK, and IFAC (2001) do not refer to 
the audit risk model.  
 
We argue that the regulatory framework should reflect the fact that risk and independence 
are linked. In this paper, we draw on the findings in BCD and we both reconceptualise 
the audit risk model and re-examine the threats and safeguards in the UK and IFAC 
independence frameworks. In reconsidering the relationship between independence in 
fact and audit risk we are able to identify more clearly where the key audit risks and 
threats to independence really lie. We also consider how independence in appearance fits 
into the framework. The paper can be seen as responding to calls by the Public Oversight 
Board’s Panel on Audit Effectiveness to ‘enhance’ the audit model (POB 2000).  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Part two is a review of relevant 
literature, both academic and professional. In part three we review the UK and IFAC 
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independence frameworks. In part four, the main part of the paper, we analyse and 
discuss the interactions identified in BCD we consider the interactions identified in BCD 
in relation to the provisions of the UK and IFAC independence frameworks.  In part five 
we consider the implications of this analysis for the audit risk model. Part six presents the 
conclusions. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Audit risk and auditor independence  
The established audit risk model in SAS 300 identifies the overall audit risk. This is 
defined as the auditor giving ‘an inappropriate audit opinion on financial statements’  
(APB 1995).  This risk has three key components: inherent risk, control risk and detection 
risk. Inherent risk is defined as ‘the susceptibility of an account balance or a class of 
transactions to material misstatement, either individually or when aggregated with 
misstatements in other balances or classes irrespective of related internal controls’. 
Control risk is defined as ‘the risk that a misstatement could occur that would not be 
prevented or detected and corrected on a timely basis by the accounting and internal 
control system’. Detection risk is defined as ‘the risk that the auditors’ substantive 
procedures do not detect a misstatement that could be material’. Inherent and control risk 
are risks which lie within the company itself.  Detection risk lies with the auditors. The 
extent of substantive testing carried out by an auditor is a function of the assessment of 
the level of inherent and control risk within the company. A diagram of this risk model is 
shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 about here 
Some audit firms have refocused the way they assess risk and this has led to questioning 
as to whether the risk model as set out in the standards still holds. Lemon et al. (2000) 
review audit methodologies in large firms. They identify that some large firms are 
adopting what is called a business risk approach which replaces the combination of 
inherent risk and control risk. Business risk is defined as: ‘the risk that the audited entity 
will fail to achieve its objectives’.  Business risk is therefore more closely aligned to the 
objectives of the business than those of financial statement audit. The audit process then 
narrows down the business risk assessment to focus on risks of material misstatement in 
the financial statements. This approach is seen as adding value to audit as it is may help 
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management to improve business performance and manage their own risks (Eilifsen et al. 
2002) but it does not change the overall audit risk.  
 
Jeppeson (1998) suggests that one effect of the big firms making efforts to differentiate 
themselves and add value to audit by adopting  the business risk assessment process is 
that they become more closely identified with the objectives of management, and they 
consequently risk compromising their independence. However some counter balance may 
be provided as, by using this approach, the auditor acquires a better knowledge and 
understanding of the business. Power (2000) continues this argument by suggesting that 
much greater responsibility for compliance is being forced onto the company through 
regulatory initiatives, particularly the developments in corporate governance 
requirements and risk management. If the role of the auditor becomes one of involvement 
in the design of compliance systems within the company, then independence from the 
company may become more difficult to achieve. This issue emerges as one of the factors 
for which Andersen were criticised in the Waste Management case (SEC 2001).  
 
Over many years, practitioners and academics have struggled to find definitions for 
independence in the audit context. Perhaps the best known definition in the academic 
literature is that of De Angelo (1981, 186) ‘the conditional probability of reporting a 
discovered breach’. Others include: ‘the ability to resist client pressure’ (Knapp 1985); 
‘an attitude/state of mind’ (Schuetze 1994); ‘a function of character with the integrity 
and trustworthiness being key’ (Magill and Previts 1991). More recent definitions 
contained in pronouncements from various representative bodies of the profession world-
wide extend the definition of a state of mind, for example, ‘freedom from those pressures 
and other factors that compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an 
auditors’ ability to make unbiased audit decisions’ (Independence Standards Board (ISB) 
2000). 
 
The UK’s guide to professional ethics (ICAEW 2001, effective from 1 January 19971) 
refers to integrity, objectivity and independence. No definition is offered of integrity and 
independence but objectivity is defined as ‘the state of mind which has regard to all 
considerations relevant to the task in hand but no other. It is sometimes described as 
 6
“independence of mind”’.  Citron (2003) suggests that the UK framework does not focus 
sufficiently on third party perceptions of independence and ultimately promotes the 
profession’s own view of auditor independence. 
 
Interestingly, the IFAC definitions are more comprehensive.  Independence of mind is 
defined as: ‘the state of mind that permits the provision of an opinion without being 
affected by influences that compromise professional judgment, allowing an individual to 
act with integrity, and exercise objectivity and professional skepticism’. Independence in 
appearance is defined by IFAC as:  ‘the avoidance of facts and circumstances that are so 
significant that a reasonable and informed third party, having knowledge of all relevant 
information, would reasonably conclude that a firm’s, or a member of the assurance 
team’s integrity, objectivity or professional skepticism had been compromised’. 
 
None of the statements defines integrity.  EC (2001) claims ‘integrity cannot be 
evaluated in advance’. Some experimental researchers have studied the concept of 
‘integrity’ by considering auditors’ moral development.  This research draws upon moral 
psychology to investigate the cognitive process underlying ethical reasoning and 
judgement formation.  Ponemon and Gabhart (1990) use Kohlberg’s stage model of 
moral development and ethical cognition to examine an auditor’s implicit reasoning in 
the resolution of an independence conflict.  This well-validated model distinguishes three 
levels of ethical cognition: 
 
• pre-conventional – where the individual places self-interest well above the common 
interests of society and is sensitive to penalty attributes;  
• conventional – where the individual conforms to the rules of society and is sensitive 
to affiliation attributes;  and  
• post-conventional – where the individual forms a judgement conforming to ethical 
principles and not to society’s rules. 
 
The findings of an experimental study using 119 audit partners and managers show that a 
systematic relationship between auditors’ measured ethical cognition and hypothetical 
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and audit conflict scenarios and their resolution of an independence conflict exists. (This 
in later confirmed in a study by Sweeney and Roberts (1997)). They also found that 
independence judgements are significantly influenced by factors relating to penalty and 
are less sensitive to affiliation factors (i.e. living up to what is expected by people).  
 
Windsor and Ashkanasy (1995) extend Ponemon and Gabhart’s (1990) study by 
including economic and personal belief variables, in particular client management 
bargaining power and belief in a just world, in addition to the level of moral reasoning 
development.  Three styles of auditor decision-making emerged: 
 
• autonomous – auditors who were responsive to personal beliefs and were more likely 
to resist client management power; 
• accommodating – auditors who responded to both personal beliefs and client 
management power and who were least resistant to client management pressure; and 
• pragmatic – auditors who were responsive to client management power, irrespective 
of beliefs. 
These three styles correspond to individuals with high, mid, and low levels of moral 
reasoning, respectively. 
 
The contingent influence of organisational culture, i.e., the moral atmosphere of the audit 
firm, is also being explored by researchers, although no clear results have yet emerged 
(Ashkanasy and Windsor, 1997; Sweeney and Roberts, 1997).  
 
Ponemon and Gabhart (1990) also find a systematic relationship between ethical 
cognition and auditors’ priority rankings of factors influencing auditor independence.  In 
particular, subjects at the preconventional level of ethical cognition ranked freedom from 
pressure to retain client and existence of legal liability significantly higher than subjects 
at the conventional level.  Falk et al. (1999) find, in an experiment carried out with 
students, that the biggest threat to independent behaviour is the risk of losing a client.  
This is consistent with Beattie et al. (1999) who find, from a questionnaire survey of UK 
AEPs and FDs, that the two most frequently cited factors which are perceived to 
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undermine auditors’ independence are: ‘partner’s income depends on the retention of a 
specific client’ and ‘10% or more of the firm’s total  revenues come from one client’. The 
two most frequently cited factors which are believed to enhance independence are: ‘the 
existence of an audit committee composed of non-executive directors, the majority of 
whom are independent’ and  ‘big-six  firm’. (This survey was carried out before the Price 
Waterhouse/Coopers and Lybrand merger, and the Andersen collapse.) The implications 
for independence of there now being only four major firms are not yet fully understood.   
  
ISB (2000) develops an independence risk continuum which relates the assessed level of 
independence risk with the possibility of compromised activity i.e. lack of independence 
in fact.  The concept of varying degrees of independence risk is developed further by 
Johnstone et al. (2001). They argue that independence risk is a function of antecedent 
environmental conditions derived from direct and indirect incentives in judgment based 
decisions. Direct incentives are seen as direct financial interests including economic 
dependence. Indirect incentives are seen as interpersonal relationships and auditing one’s 
own. Mitigating factors are seen as corporate governance, regulatory oversight, firm 
culture and individual auditor characteristics.  These are very close to the definitions in 
IFAC (2001).  
 
Earnings Management 
Pressures on management to engage in aggressive earnings management in order to 
improve results can intensify the pressure on auditors. The APB (2001) is concerned that 
fraudulent reporting can result where earnings expectations cannot be delivered. The 
APB asks whether UK Auditing Standards should explicitly require auditors to identify 
pressures on management to deliver results, and to plan how to respond.  In one of the 
very few studies which questions auditors’ about their actual behaviour, Nelson et al. 
(2000) survey US audit partners, and find that auditors are able to prevent earnings 
management attempts (EMAs) in many cases. In certain circumstances, however, they 
may waive EMAs. These circumstances are where EMAs: decrease current period 
income; are governed by imprecise standards or are structured around precise standards 
(i.e. demonstrate creative compliance as described by McBarnet and Whelan (1991); are 
viewed as immaterial; or, are attempted by large clients. Although not specifically 
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seeking evidence of earnings management, Beattie et al. (2000) find evidence, by 
surveying AEPs and FDs, of the frequency and subject matter of discussions and 
negotiations between both parties and many of the issues identified impact on reported 
earnings.  While they find evidence that the auditor does influence financial reporting 
outcomes, the degree of independence exerted cannot be evaluated.    
 
3. THREATS AND SAFEGUARDS IDENTIFIED BY THE UK AND IFAC 
FRAMEWORKS 
The UK framework identifies threats and safeguards to objectivity. Subsequent 
frameworks issued by the EC (2001) and IFAC (2001)  take a similar approach on threats 
and safeguards but make more specific reference to the distinction between independence 
in fact and independence in appearance, thus explicitly recognising the importance of 
independence in appearance. UK, EC and IFAC frameworks identify five main threats to 
independence or objectivity. These are described below (ICAEW 2001): 
a. Self-interest threat: arises from a financial or other self-interest conflict e.g. from a 
direct or indirect interest in a client or from fear of losing a client.  
b. Self-review threat: arises from the apparent difficulty of maintaining objectivity and 
conducting what is effectively a self-review, if any product or judgment  of a previous 
audit assignment or non-audit assignment needs to be challenged or evaluated in 
reaching audit conclusions. 
c. Advocacy threat: arises from the apparent threat to objectivity if the auditor becomes 
an advocate for a client’s position in any adversarial proceedings or situations.  This 
may appear to be incompatible with objectivity.  
d. Familiarity or trust threat: arises from the risk that the auditor may become over-
influenced by the personalities and qualities of the directors and management and 
become too sympathetic to their interests. Alternatively the auditor may become too 
trusting of management representations so as to be inadequately rigorous in testing 
them.  
e. Intimidation threat: arises from the possibility that the auditor may become 
intimidated by threat, by dominating personality, or by other pressures, actual or 
feared, by a director or manager or by some other party.  
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The UK framework identifies safeguards against independence threats which the IFAC 
framework expands and classifies as: those created by the profession (the practice 
environment); those created by legislation or regulation (regulatory safeguards and 
sanctions); and those involving third parties (client’s audit committees, regulatory bodies 
or another firm). A fourth, ultimate, safeguard is the right to refuse to act. Table 1 lists 
the safeguards as shown in both frameworks. (They are matched against each other only 
in terms of generic source.) It may be observed that the UK framework refers at length to 
personal qualities and risks to individuals. IFAC goes into much more detail about the 
nature of safeguards within audit firms, describing firm-wide safeguards and 
engagement-specific safeguards.  IFAC also describes safeguards within the audit client 
particularly focussing on audit committees and corporate governance whereas the UK 
framework makes little reference to this.  
Table 1 about here 
Although the appearance and fact of independence are distinguished in the definitions, 
importantly, the threats and safeguards do not indicate whether the fact or the appearance 
of independence is being addressed. Table 2 sets out the detailed threats and safeguards 
in the UK framework and highlights key additions made to these in the IFAC proposals. 
We classify safeguards as either ‘regulatory prohibitions’ or ‘other safeguards’. IFAC 
sets out in detail the practice environment safeguards as identified in Table 1 so these 
have not been repeated in full in Table 2. They are referred to as ‘practice environment 
safeguards’. The additional IFAC proposals are shown in bold italics.  
   
Table 2 about here 
From Table 2 it may be observed that the self-interest threat provides the largest number 
of detailed threats and prohibitions. One fundamental threat is not addressed - the 
underlying fear of losing the client. It may also be observed that intimidation is the threat 
which has the least prohibitions and other safeguards attached to it. We argue that threats 
which are subject to prohibitions are no longer threats either to independence in 
appearance or independence in fact. It is the threats which are not subject to prohibitions 
where the risks lie. These are: fear of losing the client;  non-audit services; low fees;  
supporting the clients’ interests;  former partner working for the client; and intimidation.  
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4. ANALYSIS OF THE INTERACTIONS IN BCD 
What BCD is about  
In BCD, Beattie et al. (2001) analyse six case studies which cover 22 financial reporting 
outcomes agreed between the AEP and the FD using grounded theory methods. Six FDs 
of UK listed companies who indicated high levels of negotiation and discussion with 
their auditors in a questionnaire were approached for interview and all agreed to 
participate. An effort was made to select companies representing a range of company 
sizes, industry sectors and audit firms (Eisenhardt 1989).2  FDs were asked to ‘tell the 
story’, from their perspective, of the discussions and negotiations with their auditors 
referred to in their questionnaire responses, and encouraged to raise any other issues they 
wanted to (Thompson 1988). The interviewer employed both neutral, conversational 
prompts and a laddering technique. This technique requires that the interviewer keeps 
asking ‘why?’, working backwards to antecedent conditions and forwards to anticipated 
effects (Brown 1992, 293). Where necessary, subsidiary prompts used were used. At the 
close of each interview, we asked the FD for permission to interview the audit partner 
with whom the discussions and negotiations had taken place. (Without the client’s 
permission, no AEP would talk to us because of professional confidentiality rules.) All 
the FDs interviewed gave their consent. We asked the interviewee to effect an 
introduction to the AEP, before contacting the AEP direct and conducting a similar 
interview with them.  (Further details about the interview approach used can be found in 
Beattie et al. 2001, 48-50.) 
 
The outcomes are found to be influenced by a complex, interacting set of contextual 
factors, such as the level of integrity of the AEP, the quality of the primary relationship 
between the FD and the AEP, the company type and situation, the effectiveness of 
corporate   governance, the clarity of accounting rules on the issue, and the level of audit 
firm support and quality control. Although many of these factors have been identified and 
studied separately in previous research, they have not previously been addressed as 
embedded within the real-life process of interaction between FDs and AEPs which 
ultimately leads to the production of a company’s annual report and accounts. 
Conclusions are drawn from the empirical evidence in the case studies about how the 
incentives and behaviour of both directors and auditors influence the outcome of 
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interactions. The key factor in judging an outcome is whether it fully complies with the 
regulatory framework or falls short, either through non-compliance or creative 
compliance.   
 
From the company perspective, much is found to depend on the clarity of standards and 
on management’s attitude to earnings quality. Management may be motivated to manage 
earnings by specific pressures, such as debt covenants, declining performance or the 
threat of a takeover.3 Companies with a status and reputation to protect may be more 
cautious about engaging in aggressive accounting but may still do so if the motivation is 
sufficiently strong. It is found that compliance with corporate governance requirements 
does not necessarily guarantee good financial reporting outcomes.  Ownership structure 
and the existence of a dominant chief executive can outweigh such safeguards. 
 
From the audit firm’s perspective, much can similarly depend on the clarity of standards, 
the materiality of the issue involved, and the sanctions available to the auditor and the 
company. The main sanction for the auditor is a qualified audit report or withdrawal from 
the assignment, and for the company, replacement of the auditor.  
 
Three key factors from within the audit firm emerge as having significant influence on 
the quality of outcomes to interactions. The first factor is the personality of the individual 
partner (or partner type). Four partner types are identified from the cases and two more 
are hypothesised to exist. Those identified are: crusaders, safe pairs of hands, trusters and 
accommodators. Those hypothesised to exist are incompetents and rogues. The 
underlying driver of behaviour for an AEP is found to be the individual level of 
professional integrity. The second factor is the effectiveness of quality control 
procedures, broadly defined, within the audit firm. These procedures include recruitment, 
partner selection, technical support, back-up, training, evaluation and reward procedures, 
hot review and, critically, the matching of partner types to clients. The unhappy 
consequences of allocating an inexperienced partner to a company with a dominant chief 
executive who has a controlling interest in the company are amply shown by the evidence 
in BCD.  The third factor is the quality of the primary relationship, i.e. the relationship 
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between the FD and the AEP. A good primary relationship where both parties have high 
ethical standards is found to have a positive influence on quality of outcomes.  
 
How the interactions in BCD relate to the IFAC and UK independence frameworks 
The analysis in BCD focuses on the key influences emanating from within the company, 
within the audit firm and the primary relationship which affect the outcome of each 
interaction. BCD therefore provides a comprehensive analysis of the influences which 
affect the quality of each outcome analysed. In this paper, we shift perspective and 
analyse the independence dimensions associated with each outcome. It is worth 
emphasising that, as all these outcomes are factual events, the analysis relates to issues 
associated with independence in fact, not independence in appearance, and only concerns 
influences which are not subject to the absolute prohibitions set out in Table 2. The 
overall independence threats and safeguards in the IFAC independence framework (the 
safeguards are set out on the right hand column of Table 1) provide the analytical 
framework within which the interactions are examined.  The IFAC framework for 
safeguards is used rather than the UK framework as it is more recent and is likely to be 
more widely applied.  The threats are the same in both UK and IFAC frameworks. The 
interactions analysed are given the same identities as in BCD and are in respect of the six 
companies: NS plc, TJ plc, MP plc, CRA plc, RC plc and DA plc.  
 
Table 3 summarises the 22 financial reporting interactions indicating the subject of the 
negotiation and the relevant threats and available safeguards as identified in the IFAC 
framework. The final two columns evaluate the effectiveness of the safeguard and report 
the final outcome of the interaction. Where an interaction involves a threat which is not 
specifically identified in the IFAC framework, this is shown in bold and underlined under 
the heading ‘nature of threat’. (For more details regarding the interaction issues and the 
negotiation process see BCD). The wider regulatory safeguards contained in the UK 
framework are not included in Table 3, since they apply to every outcome. They could, 
however, have a significant influence on behaviour.  These safeguards include the UK’s 
system of monitoring the work of audit firms, disciplinary action by the profession, and 
enforcement role of the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) which publicises 
cases where directors were required by the FRRP to correct defects in their accounts.  
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Table 3 about here 
A number of interesting issues emerge from this analysis concerned with the threats, 
safeguards and quality of outcomes.  
 
Intimidation emerges as the most frequent threat. It appears to have two clear dimensions. 
The first (and potentially the most serious) is where intimidation is accompanied by the 
underlying threat from management of removal of the auditor (NS3, MP2). This leads to 
the self-interest threat where the auditor may perceive damage to himself personally 
(Beattie et al. 1999) through loss of income and status, as well as economic damage to the 
firm. The second dimension is bullying, where directors may attempt to overcome the 
auditor’s objections by employing aggressive behaviour without any underlying threat of 
removal from office (TJ2, TJ3). Intimidation with self-interest can also arise from within 
a firm where other partners may not support the stance a partner takes for fear of losing a 
client to the firm (MP2). Fee reductions can be obtained either by bullying, intimidation 
or both (NS3, TJ3).  
 
The principal safeguard against bullying, which is not clearly articulated in the 
framework, is linked to the personal characteristics of the AEP and his ability to stand up 
to this form of intimidation (MP2). A further safeguard is the audit firm’s partner 
selection procedures which should ensure that only robust individuals become audit 
partners. The safeguard against intimidation accompanied by threats of removal lies 
within the firm’s quality control procedures and is a self-interest threat both to the firm 
and the individual partner. A further safeguard may come from within the corporate 
governance of the company (DA5), but corporate governance per se cannot be assumed 
to be a safeguard.  A poor corporate governance structure, for example a dominant chief 
executive, or an aggressive management incentive scheme, can increase rather than 
diminish the threat to independence. 
 
The motivations for intimidation are not addressed in the IFAC framework. APB (2001) 
identifies various motivations for directors wanting to report certain results, but a further 
motivation emerges from this analysis which is face saving. Directors may intimidate 
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auditors to avoid disclosing or reporting events that show them to have made poor 
business decisions (MP1a, RC2).  
 
While the examples given of threats in the IFAC framework are not intended to be 
comprehensive, they do not include some of the threats that arise in BCD.  Three further 
examples of the self-review threat emerge from the analysis which we suggest should be 
included in the framework.  First, an AEP gives wrong advice himself and then has to 
change position (TJ3). Second, the auditor overlooks a technical point and it is picked up 
by a technical review within the firm (DA4). (The safeguard against these two events is 
technical competence, both from the AEP personally and from within the firm.) Third, an 
AEP disagrees with an interpretation provided by a previous auditor (MP1). The 
safeguard against this lies in the regulatory framework, and within the firm’s own ability 
to convince the client of the need for change. 
 
Another serious threat to independence, which is not addressed by IFAC (2001),   
emerges from the self-review threat, but is not necessarily a precursor to it. This is the 
urgency threat. This can arise when issues emerge at a late stage, either as a result of 
audit procedures or from events within the company. Auditors find themselves under 
greater pressure and subject to intimidation to reach agreement rapidly on an issue when 
the reporting date approaches (DA4, TJ3). The safeguard against this lies within the 
quality control procedures of the firm and the ability of the individual partner to resist 
pressure.   
 
Other less obvious examples of the familiarity threat also appear. Reference is made in 
IFAC (2001) to the situation where a partner in a firm moves to a client. The risks 
inherent in this situation emerge throughout TJ plc, but a more interesting example 
appears in RC plc where the FD had been senior to the AEP when they both worked for 
the same firm. Any previous relationship between an FD and an AEP clearly has the 
potential to influence the interactions between them and must be considered a familiarity 
threat. It is interesting that in both Waste Management case (SEC 2001) and at Enron, a 
significant number of senior staff within the company were formerly employed by the 
auditors.  IFAC recognises this problem as an intimidation threat.  Interestingly, the EC 
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framework, which has recently been adopted as best practice in the UK, disbars an 
engagement partner from joining a client within two years of leaving the audit firm.  
 
There are no examples in our cases of the advocacy threat. 
 
Discussion of findings 
Where the outcome of an interaction is fully compliant with the regulatory framework, 
the audit firm may be perceived to have achieved independence in respect of that specific 
interaction. Most of the interactions in our analysis show fully compliant outcomes and in 
these cases where auditors came under pressure from management, the safeguards in 
place have been sufficient to neutralise the threats.  
 
We identify three types of unsatisfactory outcome: first, an accounting treatment with 
which the AEP did not concur but which was not a breach of UK GAAP (CRA3, CRA5); 
second, creative compliance with which the AEP concurred (TJ2, TJ3); and third, a 
clearly identified breach of the framework (TJ1, RC2) with which the AEP  concurred. In 
CRA3 and CRA5, the outcomes were not as the auditor wished. Although he and his firm 
behaved independently, he had no support from the regulatory framework or from 
safeguards within the company to enforce his wishes. The option of a qualified audit 
report was not considered feasible because the issues were not a regulatory breach and 
were not material to the overall accounts.  
 
In TJ2 and TJ3 the partner encouraged the company to engage in creative compliance. 
Also in TJ plc there was an outright breach of the framework in the overvaluation of 
stock (TJ1). In this case, the partner lacked independence as he knowingly permitted poor 
quality accounting.  However in the TJ plc interactions, there are more threats to 
independence in each interaction than in any of the other cases, and the safeguards are 
much weaker. The safeguards within the company provide no support for the auditor and 
the firm’s own procedures are not effective. Added to this there is an inexperienced, 
newly appointed partner.  
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In the other case where there is a breach (RC2) the company is large and fairly 
conservative. The partner’s lack of independence in this case is more difficult to explain. 
It may be linked to the findings of Nelson et al. (2000) that auditors are more inclined to 
waive earnings management in larger companies where there may be less overall risk. 
BCD classifies this partner as a truster because he believes that the client is safe. 
Interestingly, the familiarity threat only arises in the two cases where the partners lack 
independence. One is classified as a truster and the other as an accommodator. The more 
robust partners are not likely to be influenced by such relationships.   
 
Although all the outcomes in TJ plc are poor, as the partner gave way to intimidation, 
only one outcome in RC plc is poor. The others fully comply with the regulatory 
framework. The poor outcome was not visible from the published accounts. This partner 
would  not allow the client to get away with observable non-compliance which could be 
picked up from the published accounts by the Financial Reporting Review Panel, which 
investigates visible cases of non-compliance in companies. He was, however, prepared to 
condone  non-compliance which was not visible.  
 
Another factor which emerges strongly is the varying degrees of pressure put on AEPs by 
management according to management’s motivation. This is particularly evident in NS3, 
TJ3 and MP2. In NS3 and TJ3 the matter was important to the chairman, and in MP3 it 
was important to a senior director. In CRA5 the auditor was not under pressure because 
management simply refused to co-operate, knowing the matter was not material overall. 
In any one audit outcomes may vary, and it may be much more difficult to achieve a good 
outcome depending on the pressures put on the AEP by management. It is therefore 
critical for auditors to understand fully management motivation in relation to each 
specific issue, as well as taking an overall view of the risk profile of the client.   
 
5. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
Revisiting the frameworks 
We identify no examples of the advocacy threat in our case studies, as instances of 
advocacy do not arise from the interactions. The cases deal with the fact, not the 
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appearance, of independence and how lack of independence in fact can lead to poor 
financial reporting outcomes.  
 
Threats to the integrity of the audit process arise from auditors allowing clients to get 
away with poor financial reporting outcomes, i.e. lack of independence in fact. 
Unfortunately, these threats to independence in fact are muddled up in the framework 
with the problems of independence in appearance, particularly with regard to three key 
threats, self-interest, familiarity and self-review. Most independence frameworks 
(including the UK and IFAC) already disbar the obvious conflicts of interest which 
would undermine the appearance of independence and which could also, but not 
necessarily, undermine independence in fact if the safeguards were not adequately 
applied. These are:  direct financial interest in a client (self-interest threat); a close friend 
or relative being involved in the management of a client (familiarity threat); and, 
involvement in the management of a client (self-review threat). Where an audit partner 
and a firm operated at the highest levels of integrity, even these threats need not 
undermine independence in fact, although the appearance would be unacceptable.  
 
Two threats, intimidation and familiarity, which are already identified in the framework 
emerge from our analysis as key threats to good outcomes. Intimidation encompasses 
bullying, the threat of dismissal or both. The threat of dismissal is the fundamental self-
interest threat for an auditor as it leads to economic loss and loss of face for the firm and 
very probably for the partner as well. The existence of a former relationship between the 
FD and the AEP in which the FD was dominant emerges as a key feature of the 
familiarity threat and this can also lead to intimidation.   
 
Other issues emerge from our analysis which are not explicitly identified in the 
framework but which we believe need to be recognised. First, it is fundamental that the 
motivation of management is understood by the auditor in respect of specific issues as 
this can drive the intensity of intimidation threats. Second, urgency and face saving are 
not recognised as threats and the evidence indicates them to be significant.  Third, the 
adequacy of a firm’s own procedures is critical to the quality of outcomes, as are the 
personal attributes and level of moral reasoning of the individual partners. Fourth, poor 
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quality or aggressive management also represents a threat. Fifth, the adequacy of the 
regulatory framework is also a key influence.  
 
The IFAC framework assumes reliance on the audit firm and the company’s corporate 
governance as factors which represent safeguards to independence. These factors, and the 
moral development and personal qualities of the individual partners can also be threats 
and need to be recognised as such. A particular concern for any audit firm must be the 
risk that a partner will put his own interests before those of the firm or that, as in the case 
of MP2, not all partners will support the stand taken by a partner where it could lead to 
the loss of a major client. A further risk for a firm is that an inappropriate partner is 
allocated to a client. TJ plc is an example of risks of this type where a newly promoted 
partner was allocated to a client where the CEO/chairman was known to be a bully and 
also had a controlling interest in the company.   
 
We argue that obvious conflicts of interest, which are already the subject of prohibitions, 
should be clearly distinguished in the frameworks from threats which are not the subject 
of prohibitions and have to be managed. Being already prohibited the former class of 
threat cannot undermine independence in fact. The threats which remain relate to self-
interest, intimidation and to a limited extent, familiarity. The self-interest threats are the 
risk of losing the client, low fees, the provision of other non-prohibited services and 
identifying too closely with the client. The intimidation threats are bullying by the client 
and the problems of former partners or senior staff from the firm being employed by the 
client. All these threats have to be addressed from within the firm’s own procedures, 
subject obviously to regulatory requirements and external oversight.  
 
Our findings indicate that the frameworks do not explicitly set out how fundamental 
threats to independence in fact should be managed. A further key problem which is not 
explicitly addressed in the framework is that of partner selection, i.e. ensuring that 
partners have the personal attributes to be  able to stand up to difficult clients, given 
appropriate support within the firm.   
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Revisiting the risk model 
On the basis that obvious conflicts of interest should be addressed before a client is taken 
on by a firm, our thesis, based on the analysis presented in this paper, is that 
independence in fact and independence in appearance should be conceptually de-coupled 
and that independence in fact should be factored into the audit risk model. Audit risk is 
defined as the risk that the firm will give an inappropriate opinion, and the risk model 
underpins the concept of audit quality. But the model stops at detection risk, i.e the point 
at which the firm identifies a problem. Identifying a problem does not mean that an 
appropriate opinion will be given. If the firm or partner lacks independence in fact for 
whatever reason, they may not deal properly with issues which emerge during the audit 
and an inappropriate opinion may be given. As well as arising in the BCD examples, this 
problem is also apparent in the Waste Management case (SEC 2001).  A further issue for 
the risk model emerges to a limited extent in TJ3 where wrong advice was given.  We 
suggest that poor quality technical advice, given in a current year, also increases 
independence risk because it may generate late adjustments and the subsequent urgency 
increases intimidation.  We believe that the risk model should be extended to add the 
additional risk of the firm failing to deal properly with issues which emerged. The failure 
to recognise the significance of issues which have been detected during the audit is a 
competence risk, which does not emerge from this study but which is referred to by Hall 
and Renner (1991). Without these risks the model does not properly address the risk of 
the auditor giving a wrong opinion.  
 
In addition to the inclusion of independence and competence risk into the risk model, we 
also suggest that the model should be divided explicitly into the risks which arise from 
the client and the risks that arise from the firm in order to reflect the way in which the 
independence framework recognises the safeguards.  In terms of the client based risk this 
should include motivation risk as this is key to the understanding of directors’ behaviour. 
We also break down the risk to specific periods and transactions to recognise that the 
auditor may be subject to more pressure in specific accounting periods, and in relation to 
specific transactions depending on management motivation. Our revised risk model is 
shown as Figure 2. 
Figure 2 about here  
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 6. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on six case studies of interactions between AEPs and FDs published in BCD 
(2001) we analyse 22 interactions to identify the threats and safeguards to auditor 
independence in fact which are relevant to each outcome. Poor outcomes are found to 
arise where the safeguards are insufficient defence against the threats. Additional threats 
to those specified by IFAC (2001) emerge from the cases, particularly urgency, and face 
saving and other important examples are found of familiarity threats and self-review 
threats. Management motivation is found to be a key driver of pressure on an auditor, and 
intimidation is found to be the most frequent threat. Yet intimidation receives the least 
attention in the independence frameworks. The frameworks do not recognise that threats 
can arise from within the audit firm and that corporate governance is not necessarily a 
safeguard. Threats which arise from within the audit firms are not recognised in the 
current audit risk model. An extended risk model model is therefore suggested which 
recognises the totality of audit risk since the current model only extends to the detection 
of issues and not their satisfactory resolution, nor does it include management motivation.  
 
It is also suggested that the conflicts of interest and other threats to independence which 
are the subject of prohibitions should be treated separately in the framework, so that the 
management of key threats and safeguards which undermine independence in fact, (i.e 
provision of other services, fees, the risk of losing the client, intimidation and bullying, 
and former senior staff in the audit firm holding senior positions within a client) are more 
rigorously addressed. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 The UK’s framework was developed in 1996 by the Chartered Accountants Joint Ethics Committee 
(CAJEC) and was subsequently incorporated into the ethical frameworks of the UK Institutes of Chartered 
Accountants.  
2 In analysis of this type, the recommended optimum number of cases is four to ten (Eisenhardt 1989). 
3 These pressures were acknowledged by the interviewees in the case studies. Others widely recognised to 
exist include management evaluation and compensation.  
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Table 1: Overall safeguards per UK and IFAC frameworks  
 
Overall safeguards per UK framework 
 
 
Overall safeguards per IFAC Framework 
1. Safeguards within the practice environment: 
 
a. Training encourages integrity and objectivity. 
b. Audit Engagement Partners (AEPs) should have 
sufficient regard for their careers and reputations 
to be encouraged towards objectivity and use of 
safeguards. 
c. Strong peer pressure within audit firms (AFs) and 
mutual reliance on integrity for partners to protect 
their personal reputation and avoid litigation. 
d. AFs should protect their reputation and not allow 
members of firm to risk it for short term benefit.  
e. Firms should have internal procedures and 
controls over the work of individual principals 
(see note 1).  
f. Difficult judgments should be reinforced by 
consultation (see note 1).  
g. Internal procedures could include: adequate 
training and encouragement to share concerns; 
involvement of additional principal; rotation of 
AEPs and staff; evaluation of clients before 
acceptance; review of all re-appointments; overall 
control environment- ethical training, staff 
appraisal, well maintained internal control system 
(see note 1).  
h. Additional review and rotation needed where 
additional safeguards deemed necessary.  
 
 
 
1. Safeguards within the practice environment: 
Firm-wide safeguards  
a. Firm leadership that stresses importance of 
independence and acting in the public interest.  
b. Policies and procedures to monitor and 
implement quality control.  
c. Documented independence policies; identifying 
and evaluating threats and safeguards.   
d. Internal policies and procedures to monitor 
independence and quality control.  
e. Internal policies and procedures which enable 
identification of interests or relationships. 
f. Policies and procedures to prohibit individuals 
not part of audit team from influencing audit. 
g. Timely communication of policies and 
procedures and regular training.  
h. Means of advising professional staff of clients 
from which they must be independent. 
i. Policies enabling staff to communicate concerns 
about independence.  
Engagement-specific safeguards 
a. Involving an additional professional accountant 
unconnected with the assignment to review work 
done, from inside or outside the firm.  
b. Consulting a third party, such as a committee of 
independent directors, a regulatory body or 
another professional accountant. 
c. Rotation of senior personnel.  
d. Discussing independence with the audit 
committee or others charged with governance. 
e. Disclosing to the audit committee, or others 
charged with governance, the nature of services 
and the extent of fees.   
f. Policies and procedures to monitor, and possibly 
restrict, revenue from a single client.  
g. Policies and procedures to ensure members of 
audit team do not take management decisions. 
h. Removing staff from the audit team where 
relationships or financial interests threaten.  
2.Regulatory safeguards and sanctions 
a. Profession’s ethical code.  
b. Disciplinary procedures. 
c. State delegated monitoring procedures (see note).  
2. Regulatory safeguards and sanctions 
a. Education, training and experience requirements 
for entry. 
b. Continuing education requirements. 
c. Professional standards, monitoring and 
disciplinary processes. 
d. External review of quality control system. 
e. Legislation governing independence 
requirements 
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Table 1: Overall safeguards per UK and IFAC frameworks  
 
3. Involvement of a third party such as a client’s 
audit committee, a regulatory body or another 
firm. 
3. Involvement of a third party such as a client’s 
audit committee, a regulatory body or another 
firm. 
a. When management appoints AF, persons other 
than management ratify or approve the 
appointment. 
b. Auditee employs sufficient high quality staff so 
that AF not requested to make managerial 
decisions.  
c. Internal procedures ensuring objective choice in 
commissioning non-audit engagements.  
d. Corporate governance structure, such as audit 
committee, provides oversight and 
communications regarding AF’s services.  
e. Regular communication between AF and audit 
committee regarding relationships which might 
bear on independence.  
f. AFs to establish policies and procedures relating 
to independence communications with the audit 
committee and communicate in writing at least 
once a year.  Matters to be decided by the firm.  
 
4. Refusal to act where no other course available.  
The perception of the public that auditors’ objectivity 
may be threatened is not of itself a reason to refuse 
appointment. 
4. Refusal to act where no other course available. 
 
Note 1:The requirements for monitoring independence, consulting on difficult issues and compliance 
reviews are a requirement of the UK audit regulations compliance with which is assessed as part of the 
legally required monitoring procedures. Non- compliance can result in restriction or loss of license to audit. 
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Table 2: Detailed threats and safeguards per UK independence framework (ICAEW, 2001) with additional IFAC (2001) 
proposals shown in bold italics 
 
Overall threat 
 
Component parts of each threat 
 
Regulatory prohibitions 
 
Other safeguards  
a. Undue dependence on an audit 
client, for an audit firm (AF), office 
of AF or individual partner.  
More than 15% total recurring fees from 
one client or 10% from listed or other 
public interest client forbidden. 
No level set for prohibition.  
 
AEP to review with 2nd partner support: where 
income is >10% for any client or >5% for listed 
or public interest client; where one office or one 
partner is dependent on one client for income.  
 
b. Loans to or from a client; overdue 
fees; guarantees for debts. 
 
Loans and guarantees forbidden, except 
financial institutions in normal course of 
business.  
   
Principal in AF to review overdue fees to 
establish if it constitutes a loan.  
Discuss with audit committee.  
Disclose outstanding fees.  
c. Hospitality or other benefits 
received from a client . 
 
Prohibited unless of modest value. None, no guidance on modest value.  
Discuss with audit committee.  
Practice environment safeguards. 
d. Actual or threatened litigation 
between AF and the client. (See also 
2.b. sharpened form of advocacy.) 
AF prohibited from acting where 
negligence writ issued by client. 
Impact of other litigation to be decided by AF. 
Disclose to audit committee. 
Practice environment safeguards. 
e. Participation in the affairs of a 
client. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Family and personal relationships 
(also recognised as familiarity and 
intimidation threats). 
 
Partner prohibited from acting if he is  an 
officer or employee of  the client, or a 
partner or employee of such a person (in 
UK prohibited by s.27 1989 Companies 
Act); no-one in AF should be involved in 
the audit if employed by client within two 
previous years; may not act as company 
secretary. 
 
No one on audit team should have close 
family member in a position to influence 
audit. 
 
Self-interest threat identified where closely 
connected person to partner employed by the 
client but no prohibition.  
No-one should take part in audit if employed 
by the client during the period under review.  
Practice environment safeguards. 
 
 
Practice environment safeguards. 
1.Self-interest: financial or 
other conflict e.g. direct or 
indirect interest in a client; 
fear of losing a client.  
 
   
 f. Principal or senior employee 
joining client 
Continuing threat if client’s 
director, officer or senior manager 
has been on audit team. (also 
recognised as familiarity and 
intimidation threat).  
 
Individual to be removed from audit team. 
Judgments to be reviewed. 
Individual may not participate in the 
affairs of the firm.  
Any benefits individual receives from AF  
must be pre-determined. No material 
indebtedness 
 
 
Practice environment safeguards. 
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Table 2: Detailed threats and safeguards per UK independence framework (ICAEW, 2001) with additional IFAC (2001) 
proposals shown in bold italics 
 
 
Overall threats 
 
Component parts of each threat 
 
Regulatory prohibitions 
 
Other safeguards  
g. Mutual business interest.  
Defined as joint ventures; jointly 
marketing combined services and 
products; one party distributing or 
marketing the other’s products, 
(also recognised as intimidation 
threat). 
Prohibited.  
h. Partner has beneficial interests in 
shares and trusts holding shares in 
clients. 
Partner or immediate family 
member in the same office as the 
lead engagement partner has direct 
financial interest in client. 
 
Other client service personnel or 
immediate family member direct 
financial interest in client. 
Prohibited except for insurance policies, 
pensions or investment trusts.  
 
Prohibited. 
 
 
 
 
Prohibited. 
 
AF has beneficial interests in shares 
or trusts holding shares in clients, or 
firm’s pension fund has shares in 
clients.  
Prohibited.   
1.Self-interest:  continued 
Member of the audit team or 
immediate/ close family member of 
the audit team has material interest 
in an audit client. 
If immediate family member  
remove individual from audit team.  
Practice environment safeguards. 
 i. Trusteeships, nominee holdings and 
bare trusts holding shares in clients. 
Prohibited for AF or closely connected 
person where trust holds > 10% shares in 
public interest company. In other cases 
trustee may not act as engagement partner.  
Prohibited where trustee a beneficiary of 
the trust; where the interest is material; 
where the trust exercises significant 
influence over the client; where there is 
significant influence over investment 
decisions.  
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Table 2: Detailed threats and safeguards per UK independence framework (ICAEW, 2001) with additional IFAC (2001) 
proposals shown in bold italics 
 
Overall threats 
 
Component parts of each threat 
 
Regulatory prohibitions 
 
Other safeguards  
j. Voting on audit appointments. 
 
Prohibited for principals or employee of 
AF holding shares in company.  
 
 
k. Pressures from other parties: 
connections; associated firms; outside 
influences employees. 
No employee should be used on any audit 
who would be excluded from the role of 
auditor.  
Other conflicts left to the firm to identify and 
decide upon.  
l. Provision of non-audit services 
(NAS) to audit clients (also a self-
review threat, see 2.a below). 
 
 
 
 
Holding or exercising authority on 
behalf of the audit client; preparing 
source documents or originating 
data evidencing the occurrence of a 
transaction; determining which 
recommendation of the AF should 
be implemented; reporting in a 
management role to those charged 
with governance. 
 
Holding custody of client’s assets; 
supervising client employees in their 
normal activities.  
Total fee including NAS must not be > 
10% for public interest companies or 15% 
for others.  
 
No limit set.  
 
 
 
 
Prohibited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prohibited. 
AF to review with 2nd partner support: where 
income is >10% for any client or >5% for listed 
or public interest client; where one office or 
dependent on one client for income.  
Discuss with audit committee. 
Practice environment safeguards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
m. Fee quoted is lower than charged  
by other firms. 
None. AF must demonstrate that appropriate staff and 
time assigned to client and all regulatory 
requirements adhered to.  
1.Self-interest:  continued 
n. Contingency fees. 
 
 
 
 
 
Also advocacy threat. 
 
Prohibited for audit work, reporting 
assignments, due diligence and similar 
non-audit roles incorporating professional 
opinions and expert witness assignments.  
 
Prohibited for audit work or fees which 
form part of the audit engagement.  
 
 
 
 
 
Discuss with audit committee. 
Practice environment safeguards. 
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Table 2: Detailed threats and safeguards per UK independence framework (ICAEW, 2001) with additional IFAC (2001) 
proposals shown in bold italics 
 
Overall threats 
 
Component parts of each threat 
 
Regulatory prohibitions 
 
Other safeguards  
a. Provision of other services to audit 
clients (as in 1.l above).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Provision of expert services, 
including valuations, which affect 
amounts or disclosures in the 
financial statements.   
 
AF should not prepare accounts and 
accounting records for public interest 
companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
None 
Prohibited where the valuation concerns 
matters material to the audit and involves 
subjectivity. 
AF to take care where it has designed or 
recommended systems or controls that audit 
relies on. Suggests using different staff.   
Decisions and safeguards to be documented. 
Materiality to be considered. AF to consider key  
issues associated with threat  Possible separate 
reporting lines and  additional review 
procedures 
 
AF may provide bookkeeping services to 
subsidiaries and divisions of listed companies 
subject to safeguards.  
In other cases practice environment 
safeguards. 
Provision of legal services to audit 
clients..  
Audit team should not be involved in 
provision of legal services.  
Practice environment safeguards.   
Lending staff to an audit client. Staff must not make management 
decisions, approve or sign documents or 
commit the client.  
Client safeguards. 
Design and implementation of 
financial information technology 
systems that generate information 
for financial statements. 
 Firm and client safeguards. 
 
2. Self-review: apparent 
difficulty of maintaining 
objectivity and conducting 
what is effectively a self-
review, if any product or 
judgement of previous audit 
or non-audit assignment needs 
to be challenged or re-
evaluated in reaching an audit 
conclusion.   
Internal audit services. AF personnel must not act as client 
management.   
Firm and client safeguards.     
a. AF supports client’s interests.  None. Professional person is required to strive for 
objectivity in all professional work.  
3. Advocacy: a practitioner 
becomes an advocate for a 
client’s position in any 
adversarial proceedings.  
Also self-review threat 
b. Sharpened form of advocacy: more 
committed and protagonist. (See also 
1.d. actual and threatened litigation.), 
such as promoting shares or adopting 
extreme position on accounting 
principles, tax or other matters of 
professional judgment.   
Recommendation or promotion of shares 
prohibited; leading a corporate finance 
team responsible for recommending or 
promoting shares prohibited.  
Prohibited where amounts involved are 
material to the audit and subjectivity is 
high (acting in tax matters not 
prohibited.) 
AF prohibited from committing client to 
terms of a corporate finance transaction.  
AF to decide on what is an extreme position. In 
some cases recommend that other advisors are 
sought.  
 
Practice environment safeguards. 
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Table 2: Detailed threats and safeguards per UK independence framework (ICAEW, 2001) with additional IFAC (2001) 
proposals shown in bold italics 
 
Overall threats 
 
Component parts of each threat 
 
Regulatory prohibitions 
 
Other safeguards  
3. Advocacy: continued Provision of legal services such as 
contract support, mergers and 
acquisition advice and assistance to 
client’s internal legal departments.  
AF should not act as advocate for client 
in significant litigation. AF should not 
act as general counsel for legal affairs to 
audit client.  
Audit team should not be involved in 
provision of legal services.  
Practice environment safeguards. 
a. Taking management decisions (see 
also 1.e. participation in the affairs of 
a client).    
 
 
AF taking management decisions 
prohibited. AF prohibited from acting as 
actuary for insurance company.  
AF should not make final decisions on 
client staff appointments.  
Final decisions on client staff 
appointments also seen as intimidation 
threats.  
AF to ensure any advice given is accepted by 
directors as their own judgments.   
AF to decide whether expert second opinion 
needed where AF designs systems affecting 
operations on which commercial success of 
company depends.  
b. Acting for a prolonged period of 
time.  
Audit partner prohibited from acting for 
listed company audit for >7years. May not 
take on role again for 5 years (but not 
precluded from other involvement with 
client).  
Practice environment safeguards. 
Family and personal relationships.  Practice environment safeguards. 
4. Familiarity or trust: 
becoming over-influenced by 
the personality or qualities of 
the client and being too 
sympathetic to their interests, 
or too trusting.  
Former partner working for client. None in respect of familiarity. Practice environment safeguards. 
None.  None. None.  
Family and personal relationships. See 1. f.  
Mutual business interest. See 1. g.  
Former partner working for client. None in respect of intimidation.  
5. Intimidation: being 
intimidated by threat, 
dominating personality, or 
other pressures – actual or 
feared, by the client or 
another party.  Recruitment of staff for client. See 4.a.  
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Table 3: Allocation of overall independence threats and safeguards as identified by IFAC (2001) to interactions from BCD 
 
Inter 
action  
Subject   Nature of threat Availability of safeguard Effectiveness of 
safeguard 
Outcome  
NS1 Going concern;
auditor threatened 
audit report 
qualification if 
refinancing not 
obtained. 
 Possibility of  intimidation but 
client did not threaten. 
Regulatory framework clear on 
going concern.  
Partner adhered to firm’s 
safeguards for risk 
management; procedures strong.  
 
Safeguards effective; 
company recognised 
auditor had no choice.   
 
 Accounts delayed until 
finance acquired; 
qualified report avoided 
without disagreement.  
NS2 Off balance sheet 
finance; incoming 
partner discovered 
finance leases 
accounted for as 
operating leases. 
Self-review: former partner had 
allowed creative accounting.  
Regulatory framework clear 
following change to lease 
accounting by FRS 5. 
Company safeguards: new 
directors, more conservative 
culture, effective audit 
committee. 
Safeguards effective; also 
in the company’s interests 
to avoid creative 
accounting as more 
finance needed.  
Accounting corrected to 
comply with framework.  
NS3  Recently appointed
company chairman 
wanted reduction in 
audit fees; tender 
threatened. 
Intimidation and self-interest:  
risk of losing client; possibility of 
reduction in audit quality. 
Practice environment 
safeguards clear on maintaining 
quality.  
Company safeguards: FD had 
high integrity; did not want 
reduction in audit quality.   
 
Safeguards effective; 
partner adhered to firm’s 
procedures. 
Fees reduced; no change 
to quality.  
TJ1  New computer
system identified 
material stock over-
valuation.  
Intimidation: dominant, bullying  
chairman/CEO, uncooperative 
FD; FD also intimidated by 
chairman; both bullied  newly 
appointed  inexperienced AEP; 
chairman unwilling to provide in 
full for stock write off and report 
loss.  
Self-review: previous partner had 
allowed problem to continue. 
Familiarity: FD formerly a 
partner in the firm.  
Regulatory framework clear: 
SSAP 9 ‘lower of cost or net 
realisable value’ for stock.  
Company safeguards: No 
safeguards.  
Practice environment 
safeguards: technical backup 
available (but not used).  
Safeguards not effective; 
no safeguards in company. 
firm’s own procedures did 
not adequately enforce 
framework.  
 
 
  
Chairman agreed to write 
off stock but only over 
three years; non-
compliance with 
regulatory framework 
because accounting 
policy as stated was not 
followed and SSAP 9 
breached.   
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Table 3: Allocation of overall independence threats and safeguards as identified by IFAC (2001) to interactions from BCD 
Inter 
action  
Subject Nature of threat Availability of safeguard Effectiveness of 
safeguard 
Outcome  
TJ2  Classification of
loss making product 
development costs 
under FRS 3.  
Intimidation: dominant, bullying  
chairman did not want to comply 
with FRS 3 to show loss making 
activities on face of P/L account; 
FD did not stand up to chairman.  
Familiarity: FD formerly a 
partner in the firm.  
Regulatory framework clear 
about disclosure of loss making 
activities; FRRP or audit 
monitoring could identify non-
compliance.  
Practice environment 
safeguards: technical back-up 
available. 
Company safeguards: no 
effective safeguards. 
 
Safeguards partially 
effective; Firm’s technical 
back-up procedures 
prevented breach of FRS 
3; firm suggested that 
client add extra columns to 
the P/L account as this 
treatment not forbidden by 
FRS 3.    
Presentation in P/L 
account emphasised 
profitable activities; 
creative compliance but 
no breach. 
TJ3  Classification of 
restructuring costs  
under FRS 3.  
Intimidation: dominant bullying 
chairman did not want  to comply 
with FRS 3 to show restructuring 
costs above the line as group was 
making a loss;  FD did not stand 
up to chairman; FD left auditor to 
take blame. Further intimidation 
and self-interest caused by FD 
demanding a reduction in fee after 
AGM; AEP concerned about 
losing client. 
Self-review: AEP originally gave 
wrong advice; major row when 
advice changed at late stage; 
technical errors increased 
intimidation. 
Familiarity:FD formerly a partner 
in the firm. 
Urgency threat: Much greater 
pressure when issues come up 
at last minute. 
Regulatory framework: FRS 3 
clear about disclosure of 
restructuring costs; FRRP or 
audit monitoring could identify 
non-compliance. 
Practice environment 
safeguards: technical back-up 
available. 
Company safeguards: Non-
executive director involved in 
discussion.  
Safeguards partially 
effective; FRRP threat 
used; Firm’s technical 
back-up procedures  did 
not prevent original wrong 
advice but supported 
AEP’s change of view and 
prevented breach of FRS 
3; firm encouraged client 
to  add extra columns to 
the P/L account as not 
forbidden by FRS 3; 
non-exec sided with 
chairman; firm agreed to 
reduce fee but process 
undermined AEP to the 
extent he considered 
withdrawing from client.  
Extra columns in  P/L 
account emphasised 
profitable activities; 
creative compliance but 
no actual breach. 
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Table 3: Allocation of overall independence threats and safeguards as identified by IFAC (2001) to interactions from BCD 
Inter 
action  
Subject Nature of threat Availability of safeguard Effectiveness of 
safeguard 
Outcome  
MP1 
(a) 
Agreeing fair value 
provisions on 
acquisition 
Intimidation: pressure on auditor 
because board did not want to 
appear to have overpaid for 
acquisition and directors of 
subsidiaries did not want to look 
incompetent.  
Face saving a motivation for the 
board in this case. 
Regulatory framework clear but 
final valuations judgmental;  
Company safeguards:  
conservative culture; FD and 
chief accountant had high 
integrity. 
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures within firm. 
Safeguards effective;CFO 
and chief accountant 
supported auditor in 
reaching agreement; FRRP  
deterrent to other directors. 
 
Acceptable fair values 
negotiated.  
 
MP1 
(b) 
Qualification of 
opening balance 
sheet in newly 
acquired subsidiary.  
 Intimidation: group does not 
want qualified report because of 
reputation damage.  
Self-review: different 
interpretation of regulatory 
framework from previous firm of 
auditors.  
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
UUUUUUUUUUUAdditional 
dimension to self-review. Could 
be another firm’s opinion or 
opinion shopping  
Regulatory framework clear on 
need for qualification but not 
over nature of qualification; 
auditor’s   judgement required. 
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures within firm. 
Company safeguards: strong  
audit committee; FD and chief 
accountant had high integrity; 
conservative culture. 
Safeguards effective; AEP 
supported by firm’s own 
procedures and by 
integrity of chief 
accountant and FD;  
despite not wanting 
qualification, audit 
committee supportive.  
Audit report qualified – 
disclaimer.  
MP2  Changing method
of income 
recognition in 
group treasury 
function; improving 
internal control in 
group treasury 
function.  
Intimidation: auditor criticising 
management; pressure to back 
off; risk of loss of client.  
Face saving threat  
 
Self-interest threat within firm 
and to partner personally; Some 
partners wanted him to back off. 
  
Intimidation from within firm 
 
Regulatory framework not 
clear, judgement issue. 
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures within firm; Partner 
had high integrity. 
Company safeguards:  strong  
audit committee; FD and chief 
accountant had high integrity; 
conservative culture. 
 
Safeguards effective; 
partner supported by Chief 
Accountant, CFO, CEO  
and audit committee, but 
opposed by directors and 
managers  he criticised;  
despite firm’s quality 
control procedures, some 
opposition within firm 
because of risk of losing 
client; this was ignored by 
partner.  
.  
Changes made by 
company to meet 
criticisms.  
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Table 3: Allocation of overall independence threats and safeguards as identified by IFAC (2001) to interactions from BCD 
Inter 
action  
Subject Nature of threat Availability of safeguard Effectiveness of 
safeguard 
Outcome  
CRA1 Agreeing fair value 
of property on 
acquisition. 
No apparent threat.  Regulatory framework clear but 
judgmental; Not material.  
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures within firm; partner 
had high integrity. 
Safeguards effective; 
because item not material 
to company, company 
agreed with auditor’s 
suggestion. 
Changes made by 
company in accordance 
with auditors’ wishes. 
CRA2  Fair value of 
landfill sites on 
acquisition. 
No apparent threat; no real 
difference of opinion. 
Regulatory framework clear but 
judgmental; no specific 
guidance on landfill sites.  
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures within firm; partner 
had high integrity. 
Company safeguards: fairly 
conservative but opportunistic 
culture; don’t want criticism. 
Safeguards effective; both 
sides seeking best solution. 
Both sides agreed on best 
estimate of value.  
CRA3  Depreciation on
landfill sites. 
No apparent threat. 
  
Regulatory framework clear but 
judgmental in application.  
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures; partner had high 
integrity. 
Company safeguards: fairly 
conservative but opportunistic 
culture; don’t want criticism; 
audit committee existed.  
Safeguards not effective; 
auditor did not like 
depreciation policy; 
judgment issue and auditor 
not supported by board.   
Depreciation policy 
remained as company 
wished.  
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Table 3: Allocation of overall independence threats and safeguards as identified by IFAC (2001) to interactions from BCD 
Inter 
action  
Subject Nature of threat Availability of safeguard Effectiveness of 
safeguard 
Outcome  
CRA4  Accounting for
interest on leases on 
long term fixed 
plant.  
Potential self-review for future: 
auditor wanted to get principles 
right.  
Urgency threat:  no time to 
research matter properly.  
Regulatory framework not clear 
on treatment of interest; 
company and auditor came up 
with widely different figures. 
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures and technical 
backup; partner had high 
integrity. 
Company safeguards: fairly 
conservative but opportunistic 
culture; don’t want criticism; 
audit committee existed 
 
Safeguards effective; 
Auditor argued for 
provisions based on firm’s 
technical knowledge. 
Additional provision 
made at auditor’s request 
until matter resolved in 
later year when company 
view vindicated.  
 
CRA5  Charging current
costs to 
restructuring 
provisions with 
which auditor 
disagreed.  
Threat from lack of guidance in 
regulatory framework.  
Regulatory framework not clear 
on accounting treatment; item 
not material enough for 
judgement qualification. 
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures and technical back 
up within firm; partner had high 
integrity. 
Company safeguards: fairly 
conservative but opportunistic 
culture; don’t want criticism; 
audit committee existed. 
 
  
Safeguards not effective; 
nothing in regulatory 
framework to support 
auditor; auditor did not 
agree with accounting 
treatment but not 
supported by audit 
committee or board.  
Accounting treatment 
disapproved of by 
auditor retained.  
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Table 3: Allocation of overall independence threats and safeguards as identified by IFAC (2001) to interactions from BCD 
Inter 
action  
Subject Nature of threat Availability of safeguard Effectiveness of 
safeguard 
Outcome  
RC1  Accounting for
businesses to be 
sold on under FRS 
7.  
No apparent threat; outcome was 
to the benefit of the company; 
interpretation of a new standard.   
Regulatory  framework clear on 
accounting treatment. 
 Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures and technical back 
up within firm.  
Company safeguards: fairly 
conservative but opportunistic 
culture; no desire to be 
criticised; audit committee 
existed. 
 
Safeguards effective; 
company changed position 
when realised to their 
advantage.  
FRS 7 fully complied 
with.  
RC2  Agreeing the
accounting 
treatment and the 
level of provisions 
for stock and 
defective products 
in an acquisition. 
Intimidation: implicit pressure on 
auditor because group did not 
want to show large fair value 
adjustments. 
Familiarity: previous relationship 
where FD more senior than AEP 
(see also TJ case). 
Loss of face threat. 
Regulatory framework clear;  
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures and technical back 
up within firm. 
Company safeguards: fairly 
conservative but opportunistic 
culture;. no desire to be 
criticised; audit committee 
existed. 
Safeguards not effective; 
auditor able to bypass 
quality control procedures;  
company wanted 
accounting treatment.  
Auditor allowed 
company to breach FRS 
6.   
RC3 Accounting for post 
acquisition re-
organisation costs. 
Possibility of intimidation threat; 
FD wanted to include re-
organisation costs in goodwill 
calculation.  
Regulatory framework clear. 
non-compliance could be visible 
to FRRP.  
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures and technical back 
up within firm. 
Safeguards effective; 
auditor threatened 
qualification.   
FRS 7 fully complied 
with.  
DA1  Accounting for
assets on disposal 
of businesses. 
No apparent threat. Regulatory framework clear but 
judgmental.  
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures and technical back 
up within firm. 
Company safeguards: FD had 
high integrity; strong non-exec 
director.  
Safeguards effective; 
consensus reached. 
Accounting treatment 
fully compliant. 
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Table 3: Allocation of overall independence threats and safeguards as identified by IFAC (2001) to interactions from BCD 
Inter 
action  
Subject Nature of threat Availability of safeguard Effectiveness of 
safeguard 
Outcome  
DA2  Accounting for
assets on 
acquisition of 
business. 
No apparent threat.  Regulatory framework clear on 
accounting records, not clear on 
depreciation of acquired assets.   
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures and technical back 
up within firm. 
Company safeguards: FD had 
high integrity; effective audit 
committee.  
Safeguards effective.  Accounting records 
improved and accounting 
treatment complied with 
auditors’ wishes.  
DA3    Disclosure of
acquisitions, 
disclosures and bid 
costs under FRS 3.  
No apparent threat. 
 
Regulatory framework clear: 
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures and technical back 
up within firm. 
Company safeguards: FD had 
high integrity; effective audit 
committee. 
Safeguards effective. Presentation agreed and
not misleading.  
 
DA4  Last minute
adjustments to the 
accounts (cash flow 
and leasing). 
Urgency: possibility of greater 
pressure on auditor because of 
lateness.  
Self-review: auditor had not 
picked up points before.  
 
Regulatory framework clear. 
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures and technical back 
up within firm. 
Company safeguards: FD had 
high integrity; effective audit 
committee. 
 
Safeguards effective;  
firm’s review procedures 
effective; late adjustment, 
i.e. urgency threat; did not 
become a problem because 
of integrity of FD.  
Adjustments made in a 
rush.  
DA5  Chairman’s attitude
to goodwill. 
Intimidation: dominant, bullying, 
chairman didn’t like rules.  
Regulatory framework clear. 
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures and technical back 
up within firm. 
Company safeguards: FD had 
high integrity; strong non-
executive director; effective 
audit committee.   
Safeguards effective; 
non exec supported 
auditors.  
Correct treatment 
adopted.  
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Table 3: Allocation of overall independence threats and safeguards as identified by IFAC (2001) to interactions from BCD 
Inter 
action  
Subject Nature of threat Availability of safeguard Effectiveness of 
safeguard 
Outcome  
DA6  Compliance with
the Cadbury Code 
and other non-
mandatory 
disclosures. 
No apparent threat: auditor 
insisted company drafted their 
own disclosures to establish 
responsibility and ownership.   
Regulatory framework clear; 
Practice environment 
safeguards: quality control 
procedures and technical back 
up within firm. 
 
Safeguards effective; firm 
forced company to prepare 
own material.   
Company complied with 
guidelines.  
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Figure 1: The current audit risk model (Auditing Practices Board, 1995) 
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Figure 2: Our revised audit risk model 
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